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Abstract
Hybrid Privacy-Preserving Neural Network (HPPNN) implementing linear layers
by Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and nonlinear layers by Garbled Circuit (GC)
is one of the most promising secure solutions to emerging Machine Learning as
a Service (MLaaS). Unfortunately, a HPPNN suffers from long inference latency,
e.g., ∼ 100 seconds per image, which makes MLaaS unsatisfactory. Because
HE-based linear layers of a HPPNN cost 93% inference latency, it is critical to
select a set of HE parameters to minimize computational overhead of linear layers.
Prior HPPNNs over-pessimistically select huge HE parameters to maintain large
noise budgets, since they use the same set of HE parameters for an entire network
and ignore the error tolerance capability of a network.
In this paper, for fast and accurate secure neural network inference, we propose
an automated layer-wise parameter selector, AutoPrivacy, that leverages deep
reinforcement learning to automatically determine a set of HE parameters for
each linear layer in a HPPNN. The learning-based HE parameter selection policy
outperforms conventional rule-based HE parameter selection policy. Compared
to prior HPPNNs, AutoPrivacy-optimized HPPNNs reduce inference latency by
53% ∼ 70% with negligible loss of accuracy.
1 Introduction
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is an emerging computing paradigm that uses powerful
cloud infrastructures to provide machine learning inference services to clients. However, in the setting
of MLaaS, cloud servers can arbitrarily access input and output data of clients, thereby introducing
privacy risks. Privacy is especially important, when clients upload their sensitive information,
e.g., healthcare records and financial data, to cloud servers. Recent works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] create
Hybrid Privacy-Preserving Neural Networks (HPPNNs) to achieve high inference accuracy using a
combination of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Garbled Circuit (GC). Particularly, DELPHI [5]
obtains the state-of-the-art inference latency and accuracy through implementing linear layers by HE,
and computing activation layers by GC. However, HPPNNs still suffer from long inference latency.
For instance, inferring one single CIFAR-10 image by DELPHI ResNet-32 [5] costs ∼ 100 seconds
and has to exchange 2GB data. Particularly, the HE-based linear layers of DELPHI cost 93% of its
inference latency, thereby becoming its performance bottleneck.
The computational overhead of HE-based linear layers in prior HPPNNs is decided by their HE
parameters including the plaintext modulus p, the ciphertext modulus q, and the cyclotomic order
(polynomial degree) n. HE enables homomorphic additions and multiplications on ciphertexts by
manipulating polynomials whose total term number and coefficients are defined by p, q and n.
Each HE operation introduces a small noise. Decrypting a HE output may have errors, if the total
noise accumulated along a HE computation path exceeds the noise budget decided by p, q and n.
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Fully HE adopts bootstrapping operations to eliminate noises, and thus is not sensitive to noise
budget. However, to avoid extremely slow bootstrapping operations of fully HE, prior HPPNNs use
leveled HE that allows only a limited noise budget. A large noise budget requires large p, q and n,
significantly increasing computational overhead of polynomial additions and multiplications.
Prior HPPNNs over-pessimistically assume huge noise budgets using large p, q and n. First, prior
HPPNNs do not consider the error tolerance of neural networks when defining their HE parameters
p, q and n. We found that a HPPNN can tolerate some decryption errors without degrading private
inference accuracy. Second, prior HPPNNs assume the same p, q and n for all layers. Different layers
in a neural network have different architectures, e.g., weight kernel size and output channel number,
and thus different error tolerances. Therefore, assuming the same worst case HE parameters for all
layers substantially increases computational overheads of a HPPNN. However, defining a set of p, q
and n for each layer via hand-crafted heuristics is so complicated that even HE and machine learning
experts may obtain only sub-optimal results. In this paper, we propose an automated layer-wise HE
parameter selection technique, AutoPrivacy, for fast and accurate HPPNN inference.
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Figure 1: The bottleneck analysis, working flow and HE parameter selection of DELPHI.
2 Background and Motivation
Threat Model. Our threat model is the same as that used by DELPHI [5]. AutoPrivacy is designed
for the two-party semi-honest setting, where only one of the parties may be corrupted by an adversary.
Both parties adhere the security protocol, but try to learn information about private inputs of the
other party from messages they receive. AutoPrivacy aims to protect the client’s privacy, but does not
prevent the client from learning the architecture of the neural network used by the server [5].
Privacy-Preserving Neural Network. Prior HPPNNs [1, 2, 3, 4] combine Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) and Garbled Circuit (GC) to support privacy-preserving inferences. An HPPNN inference
includes a preprocessing stage and an online stage. During the preprocessing stage, a server and a
client prepare secret sharing and GC for the online stage. In the online stage, the server and the client
compute an inference result. As Figure 1(a) shows, the HE-based linear layers in the preprocessing
stage dominate HPPNN inference latency. The security protocol of the preprocessing stage can be
summarized as follows.
• HE-based linear layer. All linear layers in a HPPNN are implemented by HE that is a cryptosystem
supporting homomorphic computations on a ciphertext without decryption. Given a public key pk,
a secret key sk, an encryption function (), and a decryption function σ(), × is an homomorphic
operation, if there is another operation ⊗ such that σ((x1, pk) ⊗ (x2, pk), sk) = σ((x1 ×
x2, pk), sk), where x1 and x2 are plaintexts. Although most HE schemes, e.g., BFV [6], can
support fast matrix-vector multiplications with SIMD evaluation, HE-based linear layers are still
the performance bottleneck of a HPPNN. As Figure 1(a) shows, HE-based linear layers consume
93% of inference latency of the latest HPPNN DELPHI [3]. During the preprocessing stage of a
linear layer (Li), the client and the server generate two masking vector ri and si respectively for
Li, as shown in Figure 1(b). The client encrypts ri as [ri], and sends [ri] to the server, while the
server homomorphically computes [Mi · ri − si] and sends it to the client, where Mi indicates the
weights and biases of Li. The client decrypts [Mi · ri − si]. The server holds si, so the client and
the server hold an additive secret sharing of Mi · ri. Before any HE computation, both the server
and the client need to share all HE parameters including p, n and q. Now the entire HPPNN uses
the same set of HE parameters [1, 2, 3, 4].
• GC-based nonlinear layer. Prior HPPNNs implement nonlinear layers by GC that is a cryptographic
protocol enabling the server and the client to jointly compute a nonlinear layer over their private
data without learning the other party’s data. In GC, an activation is represented by a Boolean
circuit. As Figure 1(c) shows, the server firstly garbles an activation, generates its garbled table
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(Ci), and sends it to the client. The client receives Ci by Oblivious Transfer (OT) [3]. In the online
stage, the client evaluates Ci to produce an activation result.
• Beaver’s-Triples-based activations. The latest HPPNN DELPHI [3] also adopts Beaver’s Triples
(BT) to implement quadratic approximations of the activation function to further reduce computing
overhead of GC-based nonlinear layers. To maintain the same inference accuracy, DELPHI uses
both GC- and BT-based activations in its nonlinear layers.
Compared to GC-only-based neural networks, e.g., DeepSecure [7], and HE-only-based neural
networks, e.g., CryptoNets [8], SHE [9], and Lola [10], HPPNNs [5] decrease inference latency by
∼ 100× and improve inference accuracy by 1% ∼ 4%.
The BFV Cryptosystem and Its HE Parameters. By following DELPHI [5], we adopt BFV [11] to
implement HE operations in a hybrid privacy-preserving network. We use [r] to indicate a ciphertext
holding a plaintext vector r, where r ∈ Znp with plaintext modulus p and cyclotomic order n. In BFV,
due to its packing technique, a ciphertext [r] ∈ R2q is a set of two polynomials in a quotient ringRq
with ciphertext modulus q. For the encryption of a packed polynomial m containing the elements
in r, a BFV ciphertext is structured as a vector of two polynomials (c0, c1) ∈ R2q . Specifically,
c0 = −a (1) c1 = a · s+
q
p
m+ e0 (2)
where a is a uniformly sampled polynomial, while s and e0 are polynomials whose coefficients drawn
from Xσ , where σ is the standard deviation. The decryption simply computes pq (c0s+c1) = m+ pq e0.
When qp  e0, e0 can be rounded off. As Figure 1(d) exhibits, the larger q is, the more likely e0
can be rounded off, the more accurate the BFV cryptosystem is. For each set of p, q, n and σ, the
LWE-Estimator [12] can estimate the HE security level λ based on the BFV standard. The larger q
and n are, the more secure a BFV-based cryptosystem is. To guarantee the correctness and execution
efficiency of BFV, the HE parameters have to follow the 5 rules [3]: ¶ n is a power of two; ·
q ≡ 1 mod n; ¸ p ≡ 1 mod n; ¹ |q mod p| = |γ| ≈ 1; and º q is pseudo-Mersenne.
BFV Batching. To support single instruction multiple data (SIMD), BFV [11] adopts Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) to pack g plaintexts into one polynomial m using a composite plaintext
modulus p =
∏g−1
i=0 pi, where p0, . . . , pg−1 are primes. In this way, p can be large enough to
accommodate the maximum intermediate result during a HPPNN inference. The CRT offers an
isomorphism between Zt and
∏g−1
i=0 Zti :
CRT : Zt0 × . . .× Ztg−1 → Zt (3) m = (r0, . . . , rg−1) 7→ r (4)
where ri ∈ Zti and r ∈ Zt. The inverse CRT (ICRT) is:
ICRT : Zt → Zt0 × . . .× Ztg−1 (5) r 7→ m = (r0, . . . , rg−1) (6)
where for any r ∈ Zt, we have CRT (ICRT (r)) = r. During decryption, we need to compute
m+ pq e0 and use ICRT to decompose m to obtain unpacked plaintexts. If e0 cannot be rounded off
during decryption, it will be decomposed into each unpacked plaintexts.
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Figure 2: AutoPrivacy: (a) HE parameter generation of prior HPPNNs; and (b) HE parameter
generation of AutoPrivacy.
HE Parameter Selection. Prior HPPNNs [1, 2, 5, 3, 4] decide their HE parameters using the flow
shown in Figure 2(a). For an entire neural network, prior NPPNNs first choose the cyclotomic order
n that is a power of two and typically ≥ 1010, and then select a prime p ≥ M , where M is the
maximum plaintext value of the neural network model (i.e., weights and biases). Prior NPPNNs must
guarantee p ≡ 1 mod n, otherwise they increase p. By the LWE-Estimator [12], based on n, p, a
standard deviation σ of noise and a security level value λ (e.g., 128-bit), prior NPPNNs computes
the maximum value (qmax) of q. According to the network architecture, prior NPPNNs obtains
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HPPNN plaintext cyclotomic ciphertext standard security decryptionmodulus log(p) order log(n) modulus log(q) deviation σ level λ error %
DELPHI [5] 22 13 180 3.2 > 128 > 2−40
DARL [4] 14 13 165 3.2 > 128 2−40
Table 1: The HE parameters of prior HPPNNs.
the minimal value (qmin) of q that can make the HE error failure rate < 2−40 [4]. From qmin to
qmax, prior NPPNNs choose the smallest q that can meet the other rules of HE parameters. A recent
compiler [13] implements the procedure of HE parameter selection shown in Figure 2(a) for a neural
network. To provide circuit privacy, prior HPPNNs [5] have to implement noise flooding [5] by
tripling log2(q) and quadrupling n. The HE parameters of recent HPPNNs are shown in Table 1.
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Figure 3: The latency com-
parison of a HE multiplica-
tion with varying n and q
(normalized to 11-120, where
log(n)=11 and log(q)=120).
HE Execution Efficiency. The latency of HE-based linear layers
of a HPPNN is decided by its HE parameters, i.e., n and q. Inputs
of a HPPNN are encrypted into polynomials consisting of n terms.
Homomorphic multiplications during a HPPNN inference are per-
formed through polynomial multiplications, where the coefficient of
each term has a modulus of q. BFV [11] adopts Number-Theoretic
Transform (NTT) [14] with modular reduction to accelerate poly-
nomial multiplications. The time complexity of a NTT-based poly-
nomial multiplication is O(n log n). Because q can be larger than
64-bit, recent BFV implementations use Residue Number System
(RNS) [6] to decompose large q into vectors of smaller integers. A
smaller q greatly accelerates HE operations. As Figure 3, 2× n and
1.5× log(q) increases the latency of a HE multiplication by 3.2×.
Drawbacks of Prior HE Parameter Selection Policies. We find
prior HPPNNs over-pessimistically choose huge values of n and q,
resulting in unnecessarily long privacy-preserving inference latency. First, prior HPPNNs ignore
their error tolerance capability, i.e., a NPPNN encrypted with smaller n and q producing a higher
decryption error rate may still achieve the same inference accuracy but uses much shorter inference
latency. Second, different layers of a HPPNN have distinctive architectures, and thus can tolerate
different amounts of decryption errors. So a HPPNN should select n and q for each layer to shorten
its inference latency. Choosing n and q for each layer does not expose more information to the client,
since prior HPPNNs [1, 2, 5, 3, 4] cannot protect the architecture of the network from being known
by the client.
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Figure 4: The ineffectiveness of conventional neural architecture search.
Neural Architecture Search. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) [15, 16], genetic algorithm [17],
and Bayesian optimization [18] are widely used to automatically search a network architecture
improving inference accuracy and latency. DRL-found network architectures without privacy-
preserving awareness can outperform human-designed and rule-based results [15, 16]. However,
naïvely applying DRL on HPPNN architecture search [19] cannot effectively optimize privacy-
preserving inference accuracy and latency, because conventional neural architecture search explores
the design space of layer number, weight kernel size and model quantization bitwidth, but not HE
parameters. Particularly, n and q are not sensitive to changes of weight kernel size, as shown in
Figure 4(a). In Figure 4(b), n and q are not sensitive to model quantization bitwidth either, particularly
when model quantization bitwidth is < 16. Although smaller weight and bias bitwidth reduces p, p
has to follow the 5 rules, and thus cannot be reduced in a highly quantized model.
DRL-based Layer-wise HE Parameter Search. On the contrary, if the HE decryption error rate is
moderately enlarged, as Figure 4(c) shows, q can be obviously reduced. In this paper, as Figure 2(b)
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shows, we propose a DDPG agent [20], AutoPrivacy, to predict a HE decryption error rate for each
layer of a HPPNN to reduce n and q, without sacrificing its accuracy, so that a HPPNN inference
can be accelerated. As Figure 4(d) shows, prior HPPNNs [1, 2, 5, 3] (net) has to select a 180-bit
q to guarantee a > 2−40 HE decryption error rate for the whole network without considering the
error tolerance capability of a neural network. Recent DARL [4] (net-L) finds the upper bounds of
HE matrix multiplications, so it can use smaller q but still achieve a 2−40 HE decryption error rate.
However, DARL does not take the error tolerance capability of a neural network into its consideration,
nor selects a set of n and q for each layer. AutoPrivacy (layer) can choose and minimize n and q
for each HPPNN layer by considering its error tolerance capability. As a result, AutoPrivacy greatly
decreases HPPNN inference latency without degrading its HE security level or inference accuracy.
The search space of predicting a decryption error rate for each layer of a HPPNN is so huge that even
HE and machine learning experts may obtain only sub-optimal results. There are totally (D × S)NL ,
e.g., ∼ 108, options, where D is the number of possible decryption error rates for each layer, e.g.,
D = 20; S is the number of possible HE parameter sets, e.g., S ≈ 5; and NL is the layer number of
a HPPNN, e.g., NL = 8.
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Figure 5: AutoPrivacy.
3 AutoPrivacy
For each layer in a HPPNN, our goal is to precisely find out the maximal decryption error rate that
can be tolerated by the layer without degrading HE security level (128-bit) or inference accuracy. The
HE parameter selection procedure obtains smaller q and n with a higher decryption error rate as its
input to shorten HPPNN inference latency. We first quantize the HPPNN with 8-bit [21] to minimize
p. Further decreasing the bitwidth of a HPPNN only decreases its accuracy, but cannot further reduce
p due to the 5 rules of HE parameter selection. We formulate the layer-wise decryption error rate
prediction task as a DRL problem.
3.1 Automated Layer-wise Decryption Error Rate Prediction
As Figure 5 shows, AutoPrivacy leverages a DDPG agent [20] for efficient search over action space.
We introduce the detailed setting of DDPG framework.
¶ State Space. AutoPrivacy considers only linear layers, and thus processes a HPPNN in-
ference layer by layer. For each linear layer i (Li), the state of Oi is represented by Oi =
(i, cin, cout, xw, xh, ks, ss, pi, qi, ni, ai−1), where i is the layer index; cin indicates the number
of input channels; cout means the number of output channels; xw is the input width, xh is the input
height; ks denotes the kernel size; ss is the stride size; pi is the plaintext modulus; qi means the
ciphertext modulus; ni is the polynomial degree; and ai−1 is the action in the last time step. If Li
is fully-connected layer, Oi = (i, cin, cout, xw, xh, ks = 1, ss = 0, pi, qi, ni, ai−1). We normalize
each metric in the Oi vector into [0, 1] to make them in the same scale.
· Action Space. AutoPrivacy use HE decryption error rate as action ai for linear layers. We use a
continuous action space to determine HE decryption error rate, since compared to a discrete action
space, the continuous action space maintain the relative order, e.g., 2−30 is more aggressive than
2−40. For Li, we take the continuous action ai ∈ [0, 1], and round it into the discrete HE decryption
error rate (DER) DERi = 2−round(Dl+ai×(Dr−Dl)), where 2−Dl and 2−Dr denote the maximal
and minimal HE decryption error rate. In this paper, we set Dl = 5 and Dr = 15. We input the
predicted HE decryption error rate to the procedure of HE parameter selection shown in Figure 2(b)
to get p, q, and n. To consider a constraint on inference latency, we can limit the action space.
• Latency Constraint on Action Space. Some privacy-persevering applications have a limited
budget on inference latency. We aim to find the HE parameter policy with the best accuracy under
a latency constraint. We make our agent to meet a given latency budget by limiting its action
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space. After our agent produces actions for all layers, we measure HPPNN inference latency with
the predicted HE parameters. If the current policy exceeds the latency budget, our agent will
sequentially decrease n and/or q of each layer until the latency constraint is satisfied.
• Inference Latency Estimation. To avoid high HPPNN inference overhead, we profile and record
the latencies of polynomial multiplications and additions with various values of n and q. From the
network topology, we extract key operation information such as the number of homomorphic SIMD
multiplications, the number of homomorphic slot rotations, and the number of SIMD additions. By
the latency and number of each type of operations, we can fast calculate the approximate latency
of a HHPP inference.
¸ Reward. Since a latency constraint can be imposed by limiting the action space, we define our
reward R to be related to only inference accuracy, i.e., R = −err, where err is HPPNN inference
error rate. We estimate the inference accuracy of a HPPNN as follows. Performing millions of
HPPNN inferences on encrypted data is extremely computationally expensive. After AutoPrivacy
generates HE parameters for all layers of a HPPNN, instead, we adopt the HE decryption error
simulation infrastructure in [4] to estimate the HPPNN inference accuracy. We did not observe
any accuracy loss on a HPPNN until the decryption error rate degrades to 2−7. In most case, we
perform brute-force Monte-Carlo runs are required. However, to simulate a 2−15 decryption error
rate, at least 230 brute-force Monte-Carlo runs are required. To reduce simulation overhead, we adopt
Sigma-Scaled Sampling [22] to study high dimensional Gaussian random variables. A HE-based
linear layer with the initial noise vector e can be abstracted as a function f(e). Its decryption error
rate is the probability of the decryption error ‖e‖ being greater than the noise budget ηt generated
by HE parameter p and q. The decryption error rate can be calculated as Pd =
∫ +∞
−∞ I(e)f(e)de,
where I(e) = 1 if and only if ‖e‖ > ηt, and I(e) = 0 otherwise. Sigma-Scaled Sampling reduces
error simulation time by sampling from a different density function g, where g is the same as f but
scales the sigma of e by a constant s. Because Pg offers a much larger probability, we can use less
brute-force Monte-Carlo to obtain an accurate Pg . By scaling factors and model fittings, we can run
at most 10 million Pgs and convert these values back to Pd. We record ‖e‖s resulting in decryption
errors and decompose them by ICRT. We use 50% of the ICRT-decomposed results to retrain the
HPPNN by adding them to the output of each linear layer in the forward propagation. And then, we
use the other 50% of the ICRT-decomposed results to obtain its inference accuracy.
¹ Agent. AutoPrivacy uses a DDPG agent [20], which is an off-policy actor-critic algorithm for
continuous control. In the environment, one step means that the DDPG agent makes an action to
decide the decryption error rate for a specific linear layer, while one episode is composed of multiple
steps, where the DRL agent chooses actions to all layers. The environment generates a reward Ri
and next state Oi+1. We use a variant form of the Bellman’s Equation, where each transition in an
episode is defined as Ti = (Oi, ai, Ri, Oi+1). During the exploration, Q-function is computed as
Qˆi = Ri + γ ×Q(Oi+1, µ(Ok+1)|θQ), where µ() is the output of the actor; Q(, ) is the output of
the critic; θQ is the parameters of the critic network; and γ is the discount factor. The loss function
can be approximated by L = 1Ns
∑Ns
i=1 (Qˆi −Q(Oi, µ(Oi)|θQ))2, where Ns is the number of steps
in this episode. We present implementation details of the agent as follows.
• Implementation. The DDPG agent consists of an actor network and a critic network. They share
the same network architecture with 3 hidden layers: 400 units, 300 units and 1 unit. For the actor
network, we add an additional sigmoid function to normalize the output into range of [0, 1]. The
DDPG agent is trained with fixed learning rates, i.e., 10−4 for the actor network and 10−3 for the
critic network. The replay buffer size of AutoPrivacy is 2000. During exploration, the DDPG agent
adds a random noise to each action. The standard deviation of Gaussian action noise is initially set
to 0.5. After each episode, the noise is decayed exponentially with a decay rate of 0.99.
• Finetuning. During exploration, we finetune the HPPNN model with generated decryption errors
for one epoch to recover the accuracy. We randomly select 2 categories from CIFAR-10 (10
categories from CIFAR-100) to accelerate the HPPNN model finetuning during exploration. After
exploration, we generate decryption errors based on the best HE parameter selection policy and
finetune it on the full dataset.
4 Experimental Methodology
We performed extensive experiments to show the consistent effectiveness of AutoPrivacy to minimize
HPPNN inference latency with trivial loss of accuracy.
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Hardware configuration. We ran HPPNN inferences and measured the latency of each type of
operations on an Intel Xeon E7-4850 CPU with 1TB DRAM. We assume the same network LAN
setting as DELPHI [5]. We implemented and trained AutoPrivacy on a Nvidia GTX1080-Ti GPU.
HE and GC setting. We implemented HE-based linear layers of HPPNNs by Microsoft SEAL
library [6], and GC-based nonlinear layers of HPPNNs through swanky library [23]. Because we
quantized all network models with 8-bit, we fix the plaintext modulus p as 14 [4]. To evaluate the
security level of a set of HE parameters, we relied on LWE-Estimator [12]. The same as DELPHI [5]
and DARL [4], all HE parameters we studied satisfy the > 128-bit security level. To estimate
inference accuracy, we use the original HE parameters n and q. On the contrary, we use 4× n and
3× log(q) to enable noise flooding and evaluate inference latency.
Dataset and model. Our experiments are performed on the CIFAR-10/100 dataset. We studied a
series of neural network architecture including a 7-layer CNN network used by [5] (7CNET), ResNet-
32 [24] (RESNET), and MobileNet-V2 [25] (MOBNET). 7CNET consisting of 5 convolutional layers
with 3× 3 kernel size and 64 output channels, and 2 convolutional layers with 3× 3 kernel size and
64/16 output channels. MOBNET consists of pointwise and depthwise convolution layers, each of
which is a pointwise-depthwise-pointwise block. Only 7CNET is trained and tested on CIFAR-10,
while experiments of RESNET and MOBNET are performed on CIFAR-100.
Network Scheme Latency (s) Communication (GB) accuracy (%)
tpre ton ttotal mpre mon mtotal
7CNET
DELPHI 41 0.8 41.8 0.12 0.01 0.13 81.63
DARL 28.7 0.42 29.12 0.11 0.01 0.12 81.63
AutoPrivacy 10.24 0.31 19.55 0.09 0.01 0.1 81.5
RESNET
DELPHI 90 6.4 96.4 1.9 0.04 1.94 76.78
DARL 56.7 3.83 60.53 1.7 0.04 1.74 76.78
AutoPrivacy 27 1.56 28.56 1.07 0.03 1.1 76.78
MOBNET
DELPHI 17.4 1.74 19.14 0.24 0.01 0.25 68.08
DARL 11.2 1.23 12.43 0.23 0.01 0.24 68.08
AutoPrivacy 6.2 0.72 6.92 0.19 0.01 0.2 68.05
Table 2: The execution time, communication overhead and inference accuracy comparison (tpre is the
preprocessing latency; ton indicates the online latency; ttotal is the total HPPNN inference latency;
mpre is the preprocessing communication overhead; mon means the online communication overhead;
and mtotal is the total inference communication overhead).
5 Results and Analysis
Overall Performance. The execution time, communication overhead, and inference accuracy
comparison between prior HPPNNs and AutoPrivacy-optimized HPPNNs are shown in Table 2.
Compared to DELPHI, our AutoPrivacy-optimized counterparts reduce inference latency by 53% ∼
70%, decrease ciphertext size by 20% ∼ 43%, and maintain trivial inference accuracy loss (0.1%).
Particularly, AutoPrivacy reduces offline inference latency of RESNET by 70%, and online inference
latency 75%. If a client infer multiple images, only the first one costs 28.56 seconds. It takes only 1.56
seconds for each of the following images to be tested by a heavyweight RESNET model. The CRT,
ICRT, NTT and RNS processing operations during HPPNN inferences are greatly accelerated by the
HE parameters automatically selected by AutoPrivacy. Although smaller q and n may generate more
decryption errors, HPPNNs naturally tolerate most errors without obviously decreasing inference
accuracy. We observe only 0.1% accuracy loss for MOBNET and 7CNET. Finetuning is critical
to recover the inference accuracy degradation caused by smaller HE parameters q and n. We find
on average finetuning improves inference accuracy by 8%. Especially, finetuning can eliminate the
accuracy loss for RESNET.
HP Parameter Selection. We report the details of HE parameter selection of RESNET and MOBNET
inferring on the CIFAR-100 dataset in Figure 6(a) and (b) receptively. For CIFAR-100, besides the
first convolutional layer and the last fully-connected layer, RESNET applies a stack of 6M layers
with 3× 3 convolutions on the feature maps of sizes of {32, 16, 8} respectively on 32× 32 images,
where M is an odd integer. 2M layers for each feature map size form a residual block. As Figure 6(a)
shows, AutoPrivacy automatically observes the boundary of each residual block of RESNET. Inside
each residual block, AutoPrivacy identifies the 2nd and 6th layers can work with smaller q and n,
since they have less influence to inference accuracy. On the contrary, the 4th and 8th layers in a
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Figure 6: The HP parameter comparison of AutoPrivacy against prior works (net-log(q) and net-
log(n) indicate the q and n of DELPHI, net-L-log(q) and net-log(n) mean the q and n of DARL, and
layer-log(q) and layer-log(n) denote the q and n of AutoPrivacy).
residual block have to use larger q and n, because they own larger weight in deciding inference
accuracy. For MOBNET, AutoPrivacy automatically find the difference between depth-wise and
point-wise convolutions. Depth-wise convolution layers have less accumulations thereby reducing the
number of HE rotation operations that greatly increase the noises in packed ciphertexts. Therefore,
AutoPrivacy assigns smaller n and q to depth-wise convolution layers without sacrificing inference
accuracy. In contrast, point-wise convolution layers have 1× 1 convolutions and tens to hundreds of
output channels requiring a great number of accumulations. Point-wise convolution layers have to
invoke many HE rotation operations in ciphertexts, and thus increase HE noise in ciphertexts. To
tolerate larger HE noise, AutoPrivacy has to select larger n and q to provide larger noise budgets in
point-wise convolution layers without human guidance.
Name Network Quanti- Latency Communi- Accuracy SearchArchitecture zation (bits) (seconds) cation(GB) (%) time (hours)
NASS [19] 5 CONV. + 1 FC 4∼16 20.1 0.978 84.6 60
AutoPrivacy MOBNET 14 6.13 0.2 91.4 8
Table 3: The comparison between NASS and AutoPrivacy.
Comparison against NASS. A recent work, NASS [19], automatically builds a privacy-preserving
neural network architecture by a deep reinforcement learning agent. However, instead of HE
parameters, NASS automatically searches neural network architectures and quantization bitwidths
for each linear and nonlinear layer. As a result, its search space size is too large to be efficiently and
effectively explored. Table 3 highlights the comparison of results achieved by NASS and AutoPrivacy
searching for the CIFAR-10 dataset. NASS finds a network architecture with five convolutional
layers and one fully-connected layers on the CIFAR-10 dataset. It also quantizes each linear and
nonlinear layers with 4 ∼ 16 bits. On the contrary, we train a MOBNET on the CIFAR-10 dataset
and quantize the model with 14-bit. Compared to the NASS-found network, MOBNET optimized by
AutoPrivacy improves inference latency by 69.5%, communication overhead by 79%, and inference
accuracy by 8%. The search of AutoPrivacy takes only 8 hours, but the search time of NASS is > 60
hours. This is because each time NASS has to train a neural network from scratch, then quantize
it, and finally retrain it, once it selects a topology for the HPPNN. The design space is too large
for its deep reinforcement learning agent. In contrast, we argue that the emerging compact network
architectures like MOBNET can maximize inference accuracy with less parameters. We can use a
pre-decided network architecture, quantize it with the same bitwidth, and rely on AutoPrivacy to
automatically choose HP parameters for each linear layer of the fixed architecture. Compared to the
network architecture and quantization bitwidth, choosing appropriate HP parameters for linear layers
of the fixed network more effectively reduces inference latency.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose, AutoPrivacy, an automated layer-wise HE parameter selector to optimize
for fast and accurate privacy-preserving neural network inferences on encrypted data. AutoPrivacy
uses deep reinforcement learning to automatically find a set of HE parameters for each linear layer in
a HPPNN without sacrificing the 128-bit security level. Compared to prior HPPNNs, AutoPrivacy-
optimized HPPNNs reduce inference latency by 53% ∼ 70% with negligible accuracy loss.
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